Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

Sharfarz hired Goguen to build an addition to his house. Despite taking full payment, Goguen never finished the job. Sharfarz had to pay another to finish the work and sued consumer-protection laws, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 142A. Sharfarz obtained a default judgment of $272,745. After an evidentiary hearing to assess damages, the state judge wrote that Goguen was "both deceptive and unfair, almost from the beginning and to the end," and that his "violations" had been "willful and knowing." Goguen filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Sharfarz sought to have his judgment declared nondischargeable, under a provision that bars discharge of "any debt ... for money ... to the extent obtained by ... false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud" 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(A). The bankruptcy judge denied the petition. The First Circuit vacated and remanded for determination of the nondischargeable amount. Goguen’s false statements were both the legal and factual cause of Sharfarz’s loss. View "Sharfarz v. Goguen" on Justia Law

Contractor contracted to build a restaurant in Minnesota, promising to pay each subcontractor, upon receipt of payment from the owner, the amount to which the subcontractor was entitled. Appellant became the subcontractor for carpentry and drywall work. Upon completing its work, Appellant was not paid the full amount owed. After Contractor settled a dispute with the restaurant, it offered Appellant a smaller sum, claiming it was Appellant's pro rata share of the settlement proceeds. Appellant rejected the offer and sued Contractor and its Owner in state court. Owner and his wife subsequently filed a petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief, with the debt to Appellant unsatisfied. Appellant commenced this adversary proceeding to have the debt declared nondischargeable. The bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP) determined that neither 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(4) nor 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6) barred discharge of the debt. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Owner was not a section 523(a)(4) fiduciary by reason of a Minnesota statute or Owner's Minnesota common law duties, nor did Contractor's use of its own property amount to embezzlement; and (2) the BAP did not err in finding no malicious injury, which resolved the section 523(a)(6) issue. View "Reshetar Sys., Inc. v. Thompson" on Justia Law

During the early 1990s, debtor Redondo entered into three construction contracts with the Authority: the Patillas project, construction of a bridge and access road; the Dorado project, replacement of a different bridge; the Mayguez project, highway improvements. The Authority retained the right to modify the plans; Redondo had the right to seek extra compensation. Redondo also could claim extra compensation for certain contingencies requiring substantial additional work. Each project encountered unanticipated problems, including unforeseen site conditions and flawed design plans. Redondo completed all three projects and submitted claims for additional amounts owed under the contracts, including claims for two subcontractors on the Mayaguez project. With the claims unresolved, Redondo filed for bankruptcy protection, 11 U.S.C. 1101-1174, and served the Authority with adversary complaints. The bankruptcy court awarded the debtor a total of $12,028,311.92 plus prejudgment interest at 6.5 percent, later reduced by $69,792.26. The district court affirmed. The First Circuit affirmed in part, rejecting claims concerning timely notice on one project and Redondo's standing to assert subcontractor claims. The court vacated and remanded calculation of extended overhead damages and the award of prejudgment interest. View "PR Highway and Transp. Auth. v. Redondo Constr. Corp." on Justia Law

BMD was a subcontractor for Industrial, a subcontractor for Walbridge, the general contractor for construction of a factory near Indianapolis. Fidelity was surety for Industrial’s obligations to BMD. The project proceeded for about a year before the manufacturer declared bankruptcy. Walbridge failed to pay Industrial, Industrial failed to pay BMD, and Fidelity refused to pay BMD, which sued Fidelity on the bond. Their subcontract conditioned Industrial's duty to pay on its own receipt of payment. The district court held that the pay-if-paid clause required Industrial to pay BMD only if Industrial received payment from Walbridge, rejecting an argument that it controlled only the timing of Industrial's obligation. The court held that pay-if-paid clauses are valid under public policy and that Fidelity could assert all defenses of its principal. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The subcontract expressly provides that Industrial's receipt of payment is a condition precedent to its obligation; it could have stated that BMD assumed the risk of the owner’s insolvency, but additional language was not necessary. Pay-if-paid clauses are valid under Indiana law and, under surety law, Fidelity may assert all defenses of its principal. Industrial was never obligated to pay BMD; BMD may not recover on the bond. View "BMD Contractors, Inc. v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of MD" on Justia Law

A casino-hotel filed for bankruptcy. Appellant, the administrative agent for a syndicate of lenders that loaned money to the casino's developers, and Respondents, contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers who asserted statutory liens against the property, entered into a dispute over the priority of their respective liens on the property. The Supreme Court accepted questions certified to it from the bankruptcy court regarding the application of contractual subordination, equitable subordination, and equitable subrogation in the context of a mechanic's lien. Appellant moved to strike Respondents' appendix, contending that the included documents contained information beyond the facts certified to the Court by the bankruptcy court. Respondents opposed the motion, arguing that the additional information was necessary for the Court's understanding of the certified legal questions. The Supreme Court granted the motion to strike after determining that Respondents' appendix was filed solely to contradict the certification order and the complaint, holding that while an appendix may be filed to assist the Court in understanding the matter, it may not be used to controvert the facts as stated in the certification order. View "In re Fontainebleau Las Vegas Holdings" on Justia Law

Reshetar Systems, Inc. appealed a judgment of the bankruptcy court determining that the debt owed to Reshetar by debtor was not excepted from discharge. The court held that the debt was not excepted from discharge as the trustee of a constructive trust was not a fiduciary within the meaning of Code. Sec. 523(a)(4) and Minnesota law did not create the fiduciary relationship required by the section. The court also held that nothing in the statute, the contract, or the subcontract gave Reshetar specific property rights in the payments Construction 70 received from Applebee's. Those payments belonged to Construction 70, and Construction 70's use of its own property did not amount to embezzlement. The court also held that Construction 70's use of its own property did not amount to larceny where the payments from Applebee's to Construction 70 belonged to Construction 70. The court finally held that, giving due regard to the bankruptcy court's opportunity to judge debtor's credibility, the court could not say that the bankruptcy court's finding was clearly erroneous. View "Reshetar Systems, Inc. v. Thompson" on Justia Law

In May 2002, Respondent Eagle Windows & Doors, Inc.’s predecessor purchased Eagle & Taylor Company’s assets (Eagle I) from Eagle I's bankruptcy estate. In 2000, homeowners constructed a residence using defective windows manufactured by Eagle I. In 2006, homeowners settled their construction claims against the Appellant contractor. The contractor and its insurer (Appellants) then brought this contribution suit against Respondent as successor to Eagle I. The circuit court granted respondent's motion to dismiss, holding (1) dismissal was required under Rule 12(b)(6) because a bankruptcy order expressly precluded any state law successor liability actions since the sale was "free and clear" under 11 U.S.C. 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code; and (2) that dismissal was proper under Rule 12(b)(1) of the state rules of civil procedure because the bankruptcy court in Ohio which issued the Eagle I order retained jurisdiction over any claims against respondent for successor liability. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Appellants' claim did not arise under either the settlement agreement or the order, nor did their claim relate to Eagle I. Rather, it was predicated upon Respondent's post-sale conduct which, Appellants contended, exposed it to successor liability under South Carolina state law. The Supreme Court concluded the court erred in dismissing this suit, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Nationwide Mutual v. Eagle Windows" on Justia Law