Justia Construction Law Opinion SummariesArticles Posted in Alaska Supreme Court
Dat Luong DBA LVDH Construction v. Western Surety Co.
The employee of a subcontractor on a state public works project sued the prime contractor’s surety bond for unpaid labor under Alaska’s Little Miller Act. The trial court ruled the employee failed to give notice to the contractor within the statutorily required 90 days of his last date of labor on the project. The trial court entered a directed verdict against the employee. The employee appealed to the superior court, which denied the appeal, and then petitioned the Alaska Supreme Court for hearing. This case presented two issues of first impression: (1) how to define “labor;” and (2) whether “notice” was effective on the date of mailing or the date of receipt. Under the Little Miller Act, the Supreme Court defined “labor” as work that was “necessary to and forwards” the project secured by the payment bond, and held the effective date of “notice” to be the date notice is sent via registered mail. The superior court judgment denying the employee's appeal was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Dat Luong DBA LVDH Construction v. Western Surety Co." on Justia Law
Alaska, Dept. of Transportation & Public Facilities v. Osborne Construction Co.
In August 2013 the Alaska Department of Transportation and Public Facilities (DOT) entered into a contract with Osborne Construction Company to upgrade the Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting building at the Fairbanks International Airport to withstand damage in the event of an earthquake. The DOT appealed a superior court decision reversing the agency's decision in an administrative appeal. The agency denied a contractor’s claim for additional compensation because the claim was filed outside the filing period allowed by the contract. After applying its independent judgment to interpret the contract, the Alaska Supreme Court agreed with the DOT that the contractor failed to file its claim within the period allowed. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the superior court’s decision and reinstated the agency’s. View "Alaska, Dept. of Transportation & Public Facilities v. Osborne Construction Co." on Justia Law
Lovely, et al. v Baker Hughes, Inc., et al.
A construction contractor’s employees were injured on the job and received workers’ compensation benefits from their employer. The workers later brought a negligence suit against three other corporations: the one that had entered into the construction contract with their employer, that corporation’s parent corporation, and an affiliated corporation that operated the facility under construction. The three corporations moved for summary judgment, arguing that all three were “project owners” potentially liable for the payment of workers’ compensation benefits and therefore were protected from liability under the exclusive liability provision of the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act. The superior court granted the motion, rejecting the workers’ argument that status as a “project owner” was limited to a corporation that had a contractual relationship with their employer. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded a project owner, for purposes of the Act, "must be someone who actually contracts with a person to perform specific work and enjoys the beneficial use of that work." Furthermore, the Court found the workers raised issues of material fact about which of the three corporate defendants satisfied this definition. Judgment was therefore reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Lovely, et al. v Baker Hughes, Inc., et al." on Justia Law
Nelson v. Municipality of Anchorage
Appellant Ryan Nelson agreed to perform an errand for his employer, a subcontractor, on the Appellant's day off. While on in the errand, the Appellant was injured at the job site. His employer filed a "notice of controversion" on the basis that Appellant was intoxicated at the time of the injury and his injuries were proximately caused by his intoxication. Appellant sued the general contractor and the Municipality of Anchorage (the owner of the job site) for negligence. The defendants asked the superior court to dismiss the action under the exclusive remedy provision of the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act. The superior court granted summary judgment to the general contractor and the Municipality. Appellant appeals, arguing that lack of a workers' compensation remedy permits him to bring a common law negligence action or, alternatively, that the exclusivity provision of the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act denied him due process. He also argued as a matter of statutory construction, that the Municipality could not be a project owner. Because the worker has not shown that the employer’s controversion of benefits left him to his common law remedies, the Supreme Court determined Appellant's statutory construction and constitutional claims were not ripe. The Court also held that the Municipality could be a project owner. View "Nelson v. Municipality of Anchorage" on Justia Law
ASRC Energy Services Power v. Golden Valley Electric
This case arose from an award by Golden Valley Electric Association (GVEA) of two competitively bid construction contracts on its Northern Intertie Project. In November 2001 GVEA awarded Global Power & Communications, LLC (Global) a $39.4 million contract (Contract NI-8) for construction of the Northern Intertie’s Tanana River flats section. Later GVEA awarded Global an approximately $5.3 million contract (Contract NI-9) for construction of the Northern Intertie’s Tanana River crossing and Fairbanks sections. Subsequently, after Global had been awarded NI-9 and before it had completed work on NI-8, Global presented GVEA with requests for additional compensation (RFIs) totaling approximately $2.4 million in connection with NI-8. GVEA responded that it found "no legitimate basis" to justify Global’s RFIs and rejected Global’s request for additional payment. Global also notified GVEA that Global would submit more RFIs, arising out of both NI-8 and NI-9. In all, Global sought additional compensation totaling $5.7 million under the two contracts. GVEA responded to Global denying most of the RFIs but indicated that it would approve a few and consider partial payment for a few others. Global sued, and a trial court ultimately held in GVEA's favor, awarding it costs under both the contract and the applicable state law. Global appealed, arguing among other things, the trial court abused its discretion in ruling in favor of GVEA. Upon review of the lengthy record from the trial court, the applicable legal authority and legislative history, and the two contracts in question, the Supreme Court partly affirmed and partly vacated the trial court's decision. The case was remanded for: (1) a fee determination regarding GVEA’s "UTPA" claim against Global and (2) a new trial on causation and damages relating to GVEA’s breach of NI-9. View "ASRC Energy Services Power v. Golden Valley Electric" on Justia Law
Handle Construction Co., Inc. v. Norcon, Inc.
A construction company solicited a bid from a subcontractor to perform concrete work. The construction company provided a plan and bid schedule. The subcontractor responded with a proposal, which the construction company accepted. The subcontractor carried out the subcontract as it understood the terms. After the work was completed, the subcontractor discovered it had inadvertently underbid on the project. In the ensuing lawsuit, the superior court granted partial summary judgment to the construction company with respect to all damages claimed in relation to the bidding error. The subcontractor appealed the partial summary judgment order, claiming breach of an implied warranty that the plans and specifications would be sufficient, and arguing that the superior court erred by applying the theory of unilateral mistake to the case. Because the construction company did not breach the implied warranty and the subcontractor committed a unilateral mistake for which it bore the risk, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Handle Construction Co., Inc. v. Norcon, Inc." on Justia Law
Khalsa v. Chose
Appellant Shabd-Sangeet Khalsa bought a home kit from Mandala Custom Homes in 2003. The house was assembled and Appellant moved in. Shortly thereafter, the house developed various problems. Appellant climbed a ladder to inspect a leak in the ceiling and fell, injuring herself. Appellant sued Mandala and other parties in 2006, alleging that the house was defective and that the defects in the home caused a host of other damages, including those related to her fall. The superior court set a discovery schedule. When discovery did not proceed smoothly, the court ordered Appellant to sign medical releases, present herself for deposition, and submit to medical testing, cautioning her that if she did not comply with discovery orders, the court would impose sanctions against her. When Appellant refused to sign the medical release forms, the court found her in contempt and dismissed her fall-related claims. Proceeding with Appellant's other claims, the court turned to Appellant's deposition which had been delayed multiple times. The superior court concluded that Appellant's conduct when she eventually did appear constituted a willful refusal to comply with its orders. The court then dismissed Appellant's entire case with prejudice. Appellant argued on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion. Finding no abuse, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal. View "Khalsa v. Chose" on Justia Law
Safar v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
In 2006, Appellant Yvan Safar contracted with developer Per Bjorn-Roli to construct a 12-unit condominium project. Appellee Wells Fargo agreed to finance the project. By early 2007, the developer paid Appellant the entire amount of his contract, and Wells Fargo disbursed the entire loan, but the units were not complete. Appellant allegedly used his own funds to meet his payroll needs on the project. The project overran its budget, and Wells Fargo had to foreclose. Appellant contended that the bank promised to reimburse him for monies he spent in contemplating the completion of the project. After trial, the superior court found that Wells Fargo made no enforceable promise to Appellant to reimburse him. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the bank did not make any promise or commitment to Appellant sufficient to meet the "actual promise" element of promissory estoppel. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of Appellant's case. View "Safar v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law