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Berkeley appealed the judgment against it in a construction dispute regarding a building on the Merced Campus. After the University denied Berkeley's claim for compensation for work performed, Berkeley filed suit alleging causes of action for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of the implied covenant of the correctness of the plans and specifications. The Court of Appeal held that the jury's findings were not fatally inconsistent and the verdict was not against the law; the trial court did not err in instructing the jury that specification 03300 of the contract constituted a performance specification, and Berkeley was required to exercise its skill and judgment in selecting the means, methods, and equipment necessary to meet the end result called for in the specification; there was no abuse of discretion or deprivation of a fair trial; Berkeley has not demonstrated any prejudicial error in the trial court's exclusion of evidence of the total cost method of calculating damages; and Berkeley has not established any reversible error in the trial court's award of mediation fees as costs. However, the court held that the expert witness fees were improperly included in the award of costs and therefore must be modified. The court otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "Berkeley Cement, Inc. v. Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

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Petitioners sought a writ of mandate and declaratory relief, alleging that the City of Monterey Park breached its duty under Labor Code section 1072 to award a 10-percent bidding preference only to contractors who declare in their bids they will retain existing employees for at least 90 days. The trial court held that there was no such duty and ruled in favor of the City. The Court of Appeal held that words "shall declare as part of the bid" in Labor Code section 1072, subdivision (a), mean the bidder must state in its bid whether it will retain the employees of the prior contractor for 90 days. If the public agency (or "awarding authority") gives the statutory preference to bidders who do not agree in their bids to retain the employees of the prior contractor for at least 90 days, a bidder who makes the commitment is not really getting a statutory preference. The court held that whether a variance is inconsequential is a question of fact, subject to review for substantial evidence, that is not properly decided on demurrer. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded with directions for the trial court to vacate its order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend and to enter a new order overruling the demurrer. View "International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. City of Monterey Park" on Justia Law

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The South Carolina Supreme Court accepted a certified question of South Carolina law from the federal district court, which stemmed from the construction of a home near Mount Pleasant, South Carolina. Mark Lawrence constructed his home using structural insulated panels manufactured by General Panel Corporation. Structural insulated panels (SIPs) are a structural alternative to traditional wood-frame construction. Lawrence claims faulty installation of the General Panel SIPs used in constructing his home allowed water intrusion, which in turn caused the panels to rot, damaging the structural integrity of his home. He brought a claim in federal district court alleging General Panel was liable for providing defective installation instructions to the subcontractor installing the SIPs. General Panel filed a motion for summary judgment, based on a South Carolina statute of repose: 15-3-640. The statute provided "No actions to recover damages based upon or arising out of the defective or unsafe condition of an improvement to real property may be brought more than eight years after substantial completion of the improvement." General Panel's relief depended on the date of "substantial completion." The subcontractor completed the installation of the SIPs in Lawrence's home by March 2007. The home was not finished, however, until over a year later. Charleston County issued a certificate of occupancy on December 10, 2008. Lawrence filed his lawsuit against General Panel on December 8, 2016, more than eight years after installation of the SIPs, but less than eight years after the certificate of occupancy was issued. The federal district court asked whether South Carolina Act 27 of 2005 amended section 15-3- 640 (Supp. 2018) so that the date of "substantial completion of the improvement" is measured from the date of the certificate of occupancy (unless the parties establish a different date by written agreement), thereby superseding the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Ocean Winds Corp. of Johns Island v. Lane, 556 S.E.2d 377 (2001). The Supreme Court responded in the negative: the 2005 amendments did not supersede Ocean Winds. View "Lawrence v. General Panel Corp." on Justia Law

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The Court of Appeal affirmed the superior court's denial of JMS's petition for writ of administrative mandate seeking to set aside an administrative decision by the District that allowed a contractor to substitute another subcontractor in the place of JMS on a construction project. The court held that the hearing officer had jurisdiction to approve the request for substitution under Public Contract Code section 4107; neither substitution hearing nor the substitution decision affected a fundamental vested right; the hearing afforded JMS the due process required for a substitution hearing; substantial evidence supported the substitution decision; and thus the petition was properly denied. View "JMS Air Conditioning & Appliance Service, Inc. v. Santa Monica Community College District" on Justia Law

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The owners of units in Sienna Court Condominiums, a newly-constructed 111-residential-unit Evanston property sued, alleging that the developer, TR, sold the units with latent defects that resulted in water infiltration and other conditions that rendered the individual units and common areas unfit for habitation. The complaint alleged breach of an express warranty and breach of an implied warranty of habitability against TR, the general contractor, the architect and engineering design firms, material suppliers and several subcontractors. TR and the general contractor were bankrupt. The unit owners obtained relief from the automatic bankruptcy stay. TR and the general contractor had two separate insurance policies, each providing coverage of $1 million per occurrence with $2 million aggregate limits. Plaintiffs had recovered approximately $308,000 from TR through a warranty escrow fund required by Evanston ordinance. Subcontractors and the material suppliers asserted that they were not subject to an implied warranty of habitabililty. The circuit court denied their motion to dismiss. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that a purchaser of a newly constructed home may not assert a claim for breach of an implied warranty of habitability against a subcontractor who took part in the construction of the home, where the subcontractor had no contractual relationship with the purchaser. View "Sienna Court Condominium Assoc. v. Champion Aluminum Corp." on Justia Law

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In 2012, the Campbell Union School District (CUSD) Governing Board enacted a fee on new residential development under Education Code section 17620. The fee, $2.24 per square foot on new residential construction, was based on a study that projected that “it will cost the District an average of $22,039 to house each additional student in new facilities.” This figure was based on a projected $12.8 million cost to build a new 600-student elementary school and a projected $24.4 million cost to build a new 1,000-student middle school. SummerHill owns a 110-unit residential development project in Santa Clara, within CUSD’s boundaries. In 2012 and 2013, SummerHill tendered to CUSD under protest development fees of $499,976.96. The trial court invalidated the fee and ordered a refund of SummerHill’s fees. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the fee study did not contain the data required to properly calculate a development fee; it failed to quantify the expected amount of new development or the number of new students it would generate, did not identify the type of facilities that would be necessary to accommodate those new students, and failed to assess the costs associated with those facilities. View "SummerHill Winchester LLC v. Campbell Union School District" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court answered a certified question from the Unitde States District Court by holding that Ohio Rev. Code 4123.35(O) is not unconstitutional as applied to the tort claims of an enrolled subcontractor’s employee who is injured while working on a self-insured construction project and whose injury is compensable under Ohio’s workers’ compensation laws. Daniel Stolz was injured while working as a concrete finisher for Jostin Construction. Jostin was a subcontractor of Messer Construction Company, the general contractor for the project. Under section 4123.35(O), Messer provided workers’ compensation coverage on the project for employees of subcontractors like Jostin that chose to enroll in Messer’s self-insurance plan. Stolz eventually sued Messer and several subcontractors for negligence. Messer and three enrolled subcontractors argued that they were immune from liability under section 4123.35(O). The Supreme Court concluded that the statute provides immunity to both general contractors and enrolled subcontractors from tort claims brought by employees of other enrolled subcontractors. Stolz later amended his complaint to allege that section 4123.35(O) is unconstitutional. The enrolled subcontractors petitioned the district court to certify a question of state law to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered that section 4123.35(O) does not violate the Ohio Constitution’s right-to-remedy, right-to-jury, or equal-protection provisions. View "Stolz v. J & B Steel Erectors, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment denying Acco's petition for writ of mandamus seeking review of an administrative decision adopted by the Registrar, finding Acco in violation of Business and Professions Code section 7110 for failing to obtain a building permit before replacing a boiler. The court held that the Legislature's use of the term "willful" in section 7110 only requires a showing of general intent. The court also held that there was substantial evidence to support the Administrative Judge's determination that Acco willfully violated the applicable building laws. The court noted that the fact that an individual employee may not have been aware of a specific local permit requirement does not excuse a corporate licensee from complying with the building laws. View "Acco Engineered Systems v. Contractors' State License Board" on Justia Law

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The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment dismissal of all claims in the Second Amended Complaint against defendants in an action stemming from construction projects with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The court held that MES's claims failed to articulate any support for its accusations that Safeco breached its contractual obligations or engaged in bad faith or tortious conduct. The court noted that the claim that Safeco acted inappropriately by attending the cure meetings was particularly frivolous. In this case, MES failed to identify any good faith basis, in law or on the basis of the agreements at issue, for its assertion that Safeco had no right to take steps to meet its obligations under the surety bonds. The court sua sponte awarded Safeco double costs. View "M.E.S., Inc. v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America" on Justia Law

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The Vermont Agency of Transportation (VTrans) appealed the Transportation Board’s order granting judgment to W.M. Schultz Construction, Inc. in this contract dispute. Schultz entered into a contract with VTrans in December 2013 to replace four bridges destroyed by Tropical Storm Irene. Three bridges were completed without incident. This dispute centered on the fourth bridge, referred to as “Bridge #19.” The Bridge #19 project involved the construction of a single-span steel-girder bridge over the White River in Rochester, Vermont. The west abutment was to be placed on a deep pile foundation and the east abutment (Abutment #2) was to be placed on ledge. The work was to begin in April 2014 and be completed in a single construction season. The Board concluded that Schultz encountered “differing site conditions” in carrying out its bridge-construction project and that it was entitled to an equitable adjustment for costs it incurred as a result. VTrans appealed, arguing the Board misread the contract materials and otherwise erred in granting judgment to Schultz. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "W.M. Schultz Construction, Inc. v. Vermont Agency of Transportation" on Justia Law