Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

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The Supreme Court denied Petitioners' petition for writ relief asserting that the district court properly dismissed the claims against them as precluded by the former six-year statute of repose, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion.The City of North Las Vegas's (CNLV) hired one petitioner in this case to construct a fire station, and that contractor hired several subcontractors to assist in the construction (collectively, Petitioners). When CNLV noticed construction defects years later, CNLV filed this complaint alleging construction defect claims. The district court dismissed the claims as time-barred under Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.202's six-year period of repose. Thereafter, a legislative statutory amendment extending the repose period to ten years became effective. CNLV moved to alter the judgment, arguing that the ten-year statute of repose governed its claims. The district court granted the motion, determined that section 11.202 applied retroactively, and reinstated the claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not manifestly abuse or arbitrarily or capriciously exercise its discretion by retroactively applying section 11.202's ten-year repose period to CNLV's claims. View "Dekker/Perich/Sabatini Ltd. v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

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In a case of first impression, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review to determine whether the Commonwealth Court properly calculated the “cost” of steel products under the Steel Products Procurement Act (“Steel Act” or “the Act”), which required that “75% of the cost of the articles, materials and supplies [of a steel product] have been mined, produced or manufactured” in the United States. G. M. McCrossin, Inc. (“McCrossin”), a contracting and construction management firm, served as the general contractor for the Lycoming County Water and Sewer Authority (“Authority”) on a project known as the Montoursville Regional Sewer System Waste Water Treatment Plan, Phase I Upgrade (“Project”). In July 2011, McCrossin entered into an agreement with the Authority to supply eight air blower assemblies, which move air from one area to another inside the waste treatment facility. United Blower, Inc. (“UBI”), became a subcontractor on the Project. UBI was to supply the eight blowers required by the original specifications and was to replace the three digestive blowers as required by a change order. UBI prepared a submittal for the blowers which McCrossin in turn submitted to the Authority’s Project engineer, Brinjac Engineering (“Brinjac”). As part of the submittal, McCrossin provided Brinjac and the Authority with a form, which verified that 75% of the cost of the blowers was attributable to articles, materials, and supplies (“AMSs”) that were mined, produced, or manufactured in the United States. The total amount McCrossin paid UBI for the blower assemblies and digestive blowers was $239,800. The amount paid by the Authority to McCrossin for these items was $243,505. Authority employees began to question whether McCrossin and UBI provided products that complied with the Steel Act. The Supreme Court held the Commonwealth Court improperly calculated the cost of the steel products at issue, thereby reversing and remanding for further proceedings. View "United Blower, et al. v Lycoming Water & Sewer" on Justia Law

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KD Oak Grove and KP Westwood entered into two separate contracts with Coumanis Allen, a general contractor. Subsequently, Coumanis did not pay subcontractors for their work, and Warren & Warren, one of Coumanis’s subcontractors, filed construction liens on Oak Grove’s and Westwood’s separate real property. In both payment actions, Warren admitted to failing to file its lis pendens notice along with its construction liens, waiting 110 days to file it. The two separate legal actions were brought before the Chancery Court of Lamar County, Mississippi, and were assigned to separate chancellors. Oak Grove and Westwood filed separate motions for summary judgment, which were denied by the chancellors; they timely appealed. The crux of the appeals was one of statutory interpretation: whether the failure to comply with Mississippi Code Section 85-7- 405(1)(c)(i) (Supp. 2020), which required the simultaneous filing of a lis pendens notice with the commencement of the payment action, rendered Warren’s liens unenforceable and ineffective. Chancellor Sheldon erred by denying Oak Grove’s motions for summary judgment, and Chancellor Gambrell erred by denying Westwood’s motion to dissolve. Therefore, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the chancellors’ decisions and entered summary judgment in favor of KD Oak Grove and KP Westwood. View "KD Oak Grove, LLC v. Warren & Warren Asphalt Paving, LLC" on Justia Law

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In case number 1190525, Paul Childs and Granger Construction Company, LLC ("Granger Construction"), appealed a circuit court judgment entered in favor of Harry ("Bud") and Brenda Pommer. In their cross-appeal, case number 1190580, the Pommers appealed the trial court's judgment entered in favor of Melissa Granger ("Melissa"), as the administratrix of the estate of Daniel Granger ("Granger"), deceased. In 2014, the Pommers decided to build a garage on property that they owned in Fairhope, Alabama. Childs was referred to Bud for the work. Childs brought Granger into the project as the licensed contractor for the work. The evidence presented at trial indicated that the project experienced significant delays. Evidence was presented indicating that Granger and Childs performed some of the physical labor on the project. In March 2015, when an invoice was presented to the Pommers, Bud and Brenda told the Childs and Granger that they did not want to give them another check based on how things had been going. A "heated" meeting between the parties resulted in the Pommers hiring an attorney. Bud requested the City conduct an inspection; the garage did not pass. The Pommers subsequently hired another contractor and other companies to repair work done by Granger Construction and to complete unfinished work on the project. The Pommers ultimately sued Childs and Granger Construction for breach of contract. Childs and Granger Construction filed their answer to the amended complaint and a counterclaim, asserting breach of contract/unjust enrichment against the Pommers. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the trial court as to Granger Construction in case number 1190525. The Court reversed the trial court as to Childs, and rendered judgment in favor of Childs. In case number 1190580, the Court affirmed the trial court. View "Childs et al. v. Pommer" on Justia Law

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Lake Hills Investments LLC sued AP Rushforth (AP) for breach of contract, alleging, among other things, that the work AP conducted on the Lake Hills Village project was defective. AP counterclaimed that Lake Hills underpaid them. At trial, an affirmative defense instruction (jury instruction 9) was given, stating that “AP has the burden to prove that Lake Hills provided the plans and specifications for an area of work at issue, that AP followed those plans and specifications, and that the [construction] defect resulted from defects in the plans or specifications. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that this affirmative defense has been proved for a particular area, then your verdict should be for AP as to that area.” The Court of Appeals held that this instruction understated AP’s burden of proof and allowed the jury to find that if any part of the construction defect resulted from Lake Hills’ plans and specifications, then the jury could find for AP. The court concluded that the error was not harmless, reversed, and remanded for a new trial. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, finding that although jury instruction 9 had the potential to mislead the jury, Lake Hills could not show it was prejudiced. The Court of Appeals' judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for the appellate court to consider issues related to the trial court's award of attorney fees. View "Lake Hills Invs., LLC v. Rushforth Constr. Co., Inc." on Justia Law

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The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Maryland State Board of Contract Appeals (MSBCA) granting summary disposition as to the Maryland State Highway Administration's (SHA) claims against Brawner Builders, Inc. and Faddis Concrete Products, Inc., holding that there was no error in the MSBCA's decision to grant SHA's motion for summary decision.SHA and Brawner entered into a contract for the construction of noise barriers along a section of interstate. Faddis manufactured noise wall panels for Brawner's use in connection with the project. SHA subsequently suspended approval of Faddis-produced noise panels. Faddis filed a procurement contract claim. The MSBCA issued summary disposition to the SHA, concluding that Faddis had no standing to file such a claim. At issue on appeal was whether Faddis's status as a "pre-approved supplier" of concrete panels on construction projects administered by the SHA constituted a "procurement contract" with the State under the State Finance and Procurement Article. The circuit court reversed. The court of special appeals reversed the circuit court. The court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding that the MSBCA properly dismissed Faddis's claims and entered judgment in SHA's favor. View "Brawner Builders, Inc. v. Maryland State Highway Administration" on Justia Law

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JT Construction, LLC ("JTC"), appealed a circuit court's judgment awarding declaratory and injunctive relief to MW Industrial Services, Inc. ("MWI"). MWI contracted with Golder Associates, Inc., to provide labor and services for a construction project at Plant Gorgas, a power plant operated by Alabama Power Company. Pursuant to the terms of the contract, MWI was prohibited from "permit[ting] any lien, affidavit of nonpayment, stop payment notice, attachment or other encumbrance ... to remain on record against [Plant Gorgas] or the property upon which it is situated for ... work performed or materials finished in connection [there]with" by any subcontractor with whom MWI might also contract. JTC subcontracted with MWI to work at Plant Gorgas. The subcontract agreement ("the lien-waiver provision") precluded JTC, in accordance with the master contract, from filing a lien against property owned by Alabama Power or Southern Company. Following execution of the subcontract agreement, a dispute arose between MWI and JTC in connection with JTC's performance of its contractual obligations and the amount owed to JTC for the work it had performed. In September 2020, counsel for JTC provided a "Notice of Mechanics' Lien" indicating that JTC claimed against the real property on which Plant Gorgas was situated, a lien in connection with JTC's work under the subcontract agreement. MWI pointed out the language of the lien-waiver provision of its subcontract, and demanded that JTC withdraw the lien notice. MWI asserted that JTC had been paid for any previous work before its execution of the subcontract agreement, and demanded that JTC withdraw its notice of lien. The trial court ultimately entered an order issuing a permanent injunction and ruling in favor of MWI on its declaratory-judgment claim, prohibiting JTC from filing its lien. The Alabama Supreme Court held the trial court erred in issuing the declaratory judgment and in awarding permanent injunctive relief without prior notice to JTC, as required by Rule 65(a)(2), and that JTC was prejudiced by that error. The trial court's judgment was therefore reversed, and this case was remanded for further proceedings. View "JT Construction, LLC v. MW Industrial Services, Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs Robbie Dillinger and Steve Kimbrough, LLC sued defendants Bryant Bank, Audrey Fleming and Michael Francis Flemming, III for the cost of work performed on the Flemmings’ property. The trial court issued a final judgment in favor of defendants. Later, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint adding Joe Kimbrough as a plaintiff, which the trial court struck. Kimbrough and the other plaintiffs appealed. But because the construction parties’ appeal was untimely, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal. View "Dellinger, et al. v. Flemming, et al." on Justia Law

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The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's award of $283,609.15 in attorneys' fees to Manning in this action arising out of a contract dispute between Kinder, a general contractor, and Manning, a subcontractor.The court concluded that the district court properly applied Arkansas state law to decide the matter because the issue of attorneys' fees is a procedural matter governed by Arkansas law. The court also concluded that the subcontract's silence as to Manning's ability to recover attorneys' fees as the prevailing party does not operate as a waiver of its right to recover such fees under Ark. Code Ann.16-22-308. The court further concluded that because the requested attorneys' fees were incurred by Manning, Manning's recovery of such attorneys' fees is not prohibited under Ark. Code Ann. 23-79-208. View "Randy Kinder Excavating, Inc. v. JA Manning Construction Company, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that Specialty Companies Group, LLC's claims under an alter ego theory against Meritage Homes of Arizona were time-barred under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-548(A)(1)'s six-year limitation period for claims founded on or evidenced by a written contract.Maricopa Lakes, LLC hired G&K South Forty Development to serve as project manager on a real estate development project. G&K hired Specialty to assist with the project. Specialty later sued G&K to collect unpaid invoices. G&K filed a third-party complaint against Maricopa Lakes, was awarded a default judgment, and assigned to Specialty its claims against Maricopa Lakes. Specialty subsequently sued Meritage, which formed Maricopa Lakes, under an alter ego theory. The trial court granted summary judgment to Meritage, ruling that Specialty's claims were time-barred. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the alter ego claim was an action on a judgment governed by a five-year statute of limitations that began to run when the judgment was final. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the statute of limitations for alter ego actions is determined by reference to the cause of action from which the alter ego claim derives; and (2) Specialty was bound by the six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract. View "Specialty Companies Group, LLC v. Meritage Homes of Arizona, Inc." on Justia Law