Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

A general contractor hired a subcontractor to perform electrical work on a marina expansion project in Bristol, Rhode Island. The subcontract specified that time was critical and required timely written notice of delays, as well as an indemnification clause. After the parties negotiated an expanded scope of work and the general contractor paid a deposit, the subcontractor failed to meet the estimated completion schedule and did not provide required delay notices. As a result, the town threatened to terminate the general contract. The general contractor then terminated the subcontract and hired a replacement. The contractor sued the subcontractor and its CEO in Providence County Superior Court, alleging breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and conversion, and sought damages and attorney’s fees.The defendants answered and asserted affirmative defenses. After repeated failures to comply with discovery orders and to retain new counsel following their attorney’s withdrawal, the Superior Court issued conditional orders of default, giving the defendants multiple opportunities to comply. When they did not, the court entered a default judgment for the contractor, including damages, costs, prejudgment interest, and attorney’s fees. The CEO appeared at some hearings but not others, raising concerns about notice and service, which were addressed by the trial justice, who instructed him to file a Rule 60 motion to vacate the default if he wished to contest notice. No such motion was filed. Both sides subsequently filed motions with the Rhode Island Supreme Court relating to remand and post-judgment relief.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed whether the trial justice abused discretion in entering the default judgment. It held that the defendants’ failure to file a Rule 60 motion or properly raise notice issues in the lower court precluded appellate review of those issues. The Court found no abuse of discretion in the entry of default and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The imposition of a cash bond as a condition for remand did not violate due process. View "Reagan Marine Construction, LLC v. Costa" on Justia Law

This case centers on a contractor’s claim for a Type I differing site condition relating to a flood control project in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana. The United States Army Corps of Engineers issued a solicitation for work on the Trapp Canal, which included boring logs and cross-sections of the canal but lacked specific information about the southwest bank. Hamp’s Construction LLC, after being awarded the contract, encountered unexpected bank failures in the southwest quadrant, resulting in unsafe conditions for land-based equipment and significant delays. Hamp’s Construction submitted a request for equitable adjustment and later a formal claim, asserting that the conditions encountered were materially different from those indicated in the contract documents.The contracting officer denied Hamp’s Construction’s request and subsequent claim, concluding there was insufficient proof of a differing site condition under the relevant Federal Acquisition Regulation clause. Hamp’s Construction appealed to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals. After a hearing, the Board found that although Hamp’s Construction had faced unforeseen difficulties and increased costs, the contract documents did not provide representations or indications about the subsurface conditions of the southwest bank. The Board emphasized the absence of boring logs or explicit information for the area where the failures occurred and denied the appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for substantial evidence. The court held that, for a Type I differing site condition claim, the contract must affirmatively indicate conditions at the disputed site. The court determined that Hamp’s Construction could not reasonably rely on contract documents as indications for the southwest bank. The court affirmed the Board’s decision, holding that Hamp’s Construction failed to establish a threshold element of a Type I differing site condition claim. View "HAMP'S CONSTRUCTION LLC v. SECRETARY OF THE ARMY" on Justia Law

A general contractor and a subcontractor entered into agreements for the construction and renovation of a facility. The subcontracts required disputes to be resolved by arbitration pursuant to the rules of the American Arbitration Association. The subcontractor performed work and submitted invoices, but the general contractor, while timely rejecting the invoices and providing reasons, failed to include the good faith certification required by the Massachusetts prompt pay act. The contractor later paid the invoices after an arbitrator determined that the invoices were deemed approved due to the lack of timely certification. Subsequently, the contractor filed a counterclaim in arbitration seeking recoupment of those payments, arguing the invoices were not fair and reasonable.The subcontractor initially brought suit in the Massachusetts Superior Court, which was then compelled to arbitration per the contract. During arbitration, the arbitrator found that the contractor’s failure to timely certify its rejection of the invoices resulted in the invoices being deemed approved and ordered payment to the subcontractor. After payment, the arbitrator allowed the contractor’s counterclaim for recoupment. Following evidentiary proceedings, the arbitrator ruled in favor of the contractor, awarding partial recoupment. The subcontractor moved in the Superior Court to vacate this award, arguing that the arbitrator exceeded his authority. Relying on J.C. Cannistraro, LLC v. Columbia Construction Co., the Superior Court judge vacated the recoupment portion of the arbitration award, finding that the contractor had asserted defenses before paying the invoices, contrary to precedent.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the matter on direct appellate review. It held that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority because the award was not prohibited by law nor did it violate public policy. The court determined that the prompt pay act did not expressly prohibit recoupment in these circumstances and that the arbitrator’s actions were within the broad scope granted by the parties’ agreement and the arbitration rules. The judgment vacating the arbitration award was reversed and the matter remanded for confirmation of the arbitration award. View "J.C. Cannistraro, LLC v. Columbia Construction Co." on Justia Law

Jose Medellin, an experienced independent contractor, was hired to assist with a roofing project at an apartment complex in San Antonio. While working on the roof, Medellin, along with other workers, was responsible for stretching a rubber membrane across the roof’s surface. During this task, Medellin lost track of the roof’s edge, fell approximately thirty feet, and suffered serious injuries. He subsequently sued the general contractor, alleging both negligent activity and premises liability, arguing that the lack of adequate safety measures contributed to his fall.The case proceeded to a jury trial in a Texas district court, where the jury found JMI Contractors, LLC liable under both negligent activity and premises liability theories, awarding Medellin over $3.3 million in compensatory damages and an additional $1 million in exemplary damages. JMI appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas, which initially ordered a new trial on unrelated grounds. Upon rehearing, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the necessary-use exception applied to Medellin’s premises liability claim, and that JMI owed him a duty of care due to its control over jobsite safety.The Supreme Court of Texas granted JMI’s petition for review. The Supreme Court held that Medellin’s claim properly sounded in premises liability, not negligent activity, as his injury arose from a dangerous condition (an unguarded roof edge) rather than contemporaneous conduct by JMI. Crucially, the Court held that independent contractors cannot recover under premises liability for injuries caused by open and obvious dangers and that the necessary-use exception does not apply to them. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and rendered a take-nothing judgment in favor of JMI. View "JMI CONTRACTORS, LLC v. MEDELLIN" on Justia Law

A trade association representing licensed contractors sued a municipal government, alleging that the city violated North Dakota’s statutory competitive bidding requirements for certain public improvement projects. The association claimed that the city self-performed various tasks during a road improvement project, despite the project’s estimated cost exceeding the statutory threshold for mandatory public bidding. After the project was substantially completed, the city adopted a new ordinance authorizing it to self-perform routine street maintenance, including milling and overlaying, regardless of cost.The case was heard in the District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District. The district court granted leave for the association to supplement its complaint with factual allegations about the completed project, but denied leave to challenge the newly adopted ordinance, concluding the association lacked standing because it had not shown an actual or threatened injury from action under the ordinance. After a hearing, the district court dismissed the case as moot, reasoning that because the road project had been completed, there was no ongoing controversy or relief to be granted.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the appeal. It held that the public interest exception to mootness applied, since litigation regarding competitive bidding statutes has statewide significance and guides the conduct of public officials across North Dakota. The Supreme Court further determined that the association had standing to challenge the city’s ordinance, because it alleged facts showing the ordinance threatened injury to its members—licensed contractors eligible to bid on public projects. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings, instructing reconsideration of whether the association may amend its complaint to challenge the ordinance. View "Associated General Contractors of North Dakota v. City of West Fargo" on Justia Law

After her property experienced water intrusion, a homeowner sued her neighbor, whose property was the source of the problem. The neighbor, in defending the lawsuit, hired a construction consulting firm to inspect both properties and to create an expert report recommending repairs. The recommendations from this report formed the basis of a settlement between the homeowner and her neighbor, and repairs were performed accordingly. After the settlement and repairs, the water intrusion problem recurred, leading the homeowner to file a new lawsuit against the consulting firm, alleging that its recommendations were negligent and defective.In the Superior Court of Orange County, the consulting firm filed an anti-SLAPP motion, asserting that its actions were protected as statements made in the course of litigation. The trial court granted the motion concerning certain claims, but denied it for claims of negligence and breach of contract as a third-party beneficiary, reasoning these arose from conduct rather than protected statements. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal previously affirmed the trial court’s partial denial, finding that the remaining claims were not based on protected activity, and remanded for further proceedings on those claims.Upon remand, the consulting firm moved for judgment on the pleadings, contending that the litigation privilege under California Civil Code section 47(b) barred the remaining claims. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the consulting firm. The court held that the litigation privilege applied because the firm’s formulation of repair recommendations was necessarily related to a communicative act (the expert report) prepared in the course of litigation, and thus barred the homeowner’s negligence and third-party beneficiary claims. The judgment in favor of the consulting firm was affirmed. View "Fazel v. Pete Fowler Construction Services" on Justia Law

A Mississippi construction company, operating under the name MCA Construction, Inc., entered into a contract with an Alabama property owner to perform site development work on a residential subdivision in Baldwin County. The contract was executed on February 11, 2021, and at that time, the company held an Alabama general contractor’s license with a “Building Construction” (BC) classification and an unlimited bid limit. Shortly before executing the contract, the city engineer raised questions regarding whether the BC classification was adequate for the planned utility work (such as water and sewer installation) and indicated that an additional “Municipal and Utility” (MU) classification might be required before such work began. MCA sought clarification from the state licensing board and subsequently obtained the MU classification in May 2021, before starting the utility work.The property owner, RAM-Robertsdale Subdivision Partners, LLC, along with related parties, later alleged that MCA had performed defective work and failed to pay subcontractors, and they brought suit in Baldwin Circuit Court. MCA filed counterclaims for breach of contract and fraud, asserting that it had not been fully paid for its work. The RAM parties moved for summary judgment, arguing that the contract was void because MCA was not properly licensed with the MU classification at the time the contract was executed.The Baldwin Circuit Court granted summary judgment for the RAM parties, holding that the contract was void because MCA was not “duly licensed” for all aspects of the work at the time of contracting. MCA appealed. The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the statutory and regulatory framework, noting that MCA had a valid BC license, acted in good faith, and obtained the MU classification before performing utility work. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that substantial compliance with the licensing statute was sufficient in these circumstances and that voiding the contract was not warranted. The court reversed the summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Construction Services, LLC v. RAM-Robertsdale Subdivision Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

A developer owned all property in a residential community and petitioned a town to create a public improvement district to finance and construct infrastructure improvements, such as roads and water lines. The district’s board, composed of representatives of the developer, was authorized to levy assessments and issue bonds to fund construction. The developer and the district entered a development agreement requiring the developer to fund the improvements, and the district contracted with a construction company to perform the work. After most of the work was done, a payment dispute arose. The construction company obtained an arbitration award against the district but was not fully paid. The construction company then sued the developer and related entities for unjust enrichment, asserting that the developer received the benefit of infrastructure improvements without paying for them.The Superior Court in Maricopa County granted the developer’s motion to dismiss, concluding that, under Arizona law as interpreted in Wang Electric, Inc. v. Smoke Tree Resort, a plaintiff in an unjust enrichment claim must allege improper conduct by the property owner, and the construction company had not done so. The court also denied the construction company’s request to file an amended complaint. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the improper conduct requirement applied only in landlord-tenant-contractor cases, and allowed the construction company to amend its complaint.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case to clarify when the improper conduct requirement applies to unjust enrichment claims. The court held that the requirement only applies when the owner is a landlord and the improvements are made at the tenant’s direction. It does not extend to situations where the owner directly arranges for improvements and pays no one for them. The court concluded that the construction company’s allegations were sufficient to state a claim for unjust enrichment against the developer. The court vacated the decision of the court of appeals, reversed the superior court’s dismissal, and remanded for further proceedings. View "MARKHAM v. CAHAVA" on Justia Law

Emily Lehmberg sued Studio E. Architecture and Interiors, Inc. and other parties over the remodeling of her home. Studio E. moved to dismiss the claims against it, arguing that Lehmberg failed to file a certificate of merit as required by Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 150.002, which mandates such a certificate for claims against certain professionals. Lehmberg contended that her claims were not based on professional services but rather on alleged dishonesty and fraud. She also argued that Studio E. had waived its right to seek dismissal by waiting more than two years to file its motion. While the case against other defendants remained pending, the trial court denied Studio E.’s motion, and Studio E. filed an interlocutory appeal.The Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that Section 150.002 applied, and that Studio E. had not waived its right to seek dismissal. The appellate court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether dismissal should be with or without prejudice. The trial court dismissed the original claims against Studio E. without prejudice, but allowed Lehmberg to file an amended petition with a certificate of merit, reasserting her claims. Studio E. moved to dismiss the amended petition, arguing that reassertion was not permitted in the same lawsuit, but the trial court denied the motion. Studio E. appealed again, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that amending the petition was proper.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that when claims against a defendant are dismissed without prejudice under Section 150.002, and the underlying lawsuit remains pending, the plaintiff may reassert those claims in an amended petition along with a certificate of merit. The Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "STUDIO E. ARCHITECTURE AND INTERIORS, INC. v. LEHMBERG" on Justia Law

A worker was injured at a Manhattan construction site owned by Mezuyon, LLC during an excavation project managed by Mayrich Construction Corp. The accident occurred when the worker, who was operating a drilling rig that malfunctioned, was struck by the rear of an excavator while attempting repairs with a mechanic. The worker alleged injuries from being knocked to the ground by the excavator.The injured worker brought suit against Mezuyon, LLC, claiming common-law negligence and violations of New York Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), and 241(6). Initially, the Labor Law § 241(6) claim was based on sections 23-9.4(h)(4) and 23-9.5(c) of the Industrial Code. After Mezuyon moved for summary judgment, the worker cross-moved to add section 23-4.2(k) of the Industrial Code as a further basis for the claim. The Supreme Court allowed the amendment but ultimately dismissed all claims except the Labor Law § 241(6) claim based on section 23-4.2(k). Mezuyon then brought a third-party action against Mayrich. The Supreme Court later granted summary judgment to Mayrich and dismissed the remaining claim. The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed that dismissal, and the worker was granted leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.The New York Court of Appeals held that section 23-4.2(k) of the Industrial Code is not sufficiently specific to serve as a predicate for vicarious liability under Labor Law § 241(6). The Court reasoned that the regulation does not mandate compliance with concrete specifications but instead states a broad, general prohibition. As such, it cannot give rise to a nondelegable duty. The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division, with costs. View "Mann v Mezuyon, LLC" on Justia Law