Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a dispute arising from an oral agreement between a homeowner and a contractor regarding the construction of a wheelchair ramp and a covered addition at the homeowner’s residence. The parties did not sign a written contract or agree to a specific price, instead communicating the project’s scope via text messages. The homeowner paid the contractor $73,000, including $30,000 for siding, but the project was plagued by construction delays, quality concerns, and code violations. Work ceased before completion, and the contractor did not deliver or install the siding. The homeowner and his wife continued living in the property, though it did not receive a final certificate of compliance.The homeowner sued in the District Court of Sweetwater County, asserting claims including breach of contract, negligence, and breach of warranty. During discovery, the homeowner failed to provide a specific calculation of damages, only indicating he would supplement disclosures later. Before trial, the contractor moved to exclude any evidence of damages not previously disclosed. The district court partially granted this motion, limiting the homeowner’s evidence to what had been disclosed. At a bench trial, the homeowner did not call his retained expert and offered only the total amount paid as the measure of damages. The district court concluded the oral contract was unenforceable due to indefinite terms and found insufficient evidence to support a damages award.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Supreme Court held that, because the homeowner failed to make an offer of proof regarding excluded damages evidence, there was no basis to review the trial court’s exclusionary ruling. The court further held that the district court’s finding—that the homeowner did not prove damages by a preponderance of the evidence—was not clearly erroneous. As the damages element was not satisfied, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the claims. View "Lacher v. Case" on Justia Law

The case concerns a dispute between a homeowner and the builder of his residence. The homeowner entered into a purchase agreement in 2014 for a newly constructed home, which included a one-year residential warranty. Shortly after moving in, he noticed significant cold drafts, frost buildup, and temperature differences in the northwest corner of the home. He raised these concerns with the builder and a local home builders association within the first year, and specifically requested an insulation check before the warranty expired. The builder coordinated multiple inspections and minor repairs with a subcontractor and later, after a period of inactivity, continued to address the issues through additional inspections and proposed repairs. Nevertheless, the homeowner did not commence legal action until July 2022, after an independent inspection revealed ongoing insulation defects.The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, dismissed the homeowner’s claims for breach of warranty, breach of contract, and negligence on summary judgment. The court found the claims were time-barred under North Dakota’s six-year statute of limitations, ruling that the homeowner was on inquiry notice of potential claims as early as December 28, 2015, when he specifically identified insulation concerns. The court also rejected arguments that the builder had waived or forfeited the statute of limitations defense due to litigation conduct, or that equitable estoppel should apply based on ongoing repair efforts.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that the homeowner was on inquiry notice of his claims by December 28, 2015, making his 2022 action untimely under N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(1). The Court further held that the builder neither waived nor forfeited its limitations defense, that ongoing repair and settlement discussions did not equitably estop the builder from asserting the defense, and that no duty-to-disclose exception applied. The summary judgment dismissal was affirmed. View "Hanson v. Dabbert Custom Homes" on Justia Law

Black & Veatch Construction, Inc. contracted The Boldt Company as a subcontractor for the assembly of a windfarm in Illinois. The project quickly encountered delays due to late delivery of turbine parts, unsuitable site conditions, and issues with equipment, for which Boldt provided several written notices to Black & Veatch. Despite these notices, Black & Veatch issued multiple default warnings and ultimately terminated Boldt for cause, taking over the remaining work. Boldt sued, claiming wrongful termination and seeking payment for completed work, while Black & Veatch counterclaimed that Boldt breached by failing to perform on time.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of Black & Veatch, ruling that Boldt defaulted by failing to perform on schedule and that Black & Veatch properly terminated the subcontract. At trial, the jury was tasked only with determining damages and awarded Black & Veatch nominal damages of $1. Both parties filed post-trial motions, which the district court denied.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the jury’s nominal damages verdict, finding no reversible error in the district court’s evidentiary rulings or jury instructions. The appellate court also affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Boldt’s claims for payment for completed work and for Black & Veatch’s alleged failure to provide adequate construction works. However, the Seventh Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment on the wrongful termination claim, finding the subcontract ambiguous about whether Boldt was responsible for delays absent specific notice and that material factual disputes remained. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the wrongful termination claim. View "Boldt Company v Black & Veatch Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

A general contractor hired a subcontractor to perform electrical work on a marina expansion project in Bristol, Rhode Island. The subcontract specified that time was critical and required timely written notice of delays, as well as an indemnification clause. After the parties negotiated an expanded scope of work and the general contractor paid a deposit, the subcontractor failed to meet the estimated completion schedule and did not provide required delay notices. As a result, the town threatened to terminate the general contract. The general contractor then terminated the subcontract and hired a replacement. The contractor sued the subcontractor and its CEO in Providence County Superior Court, alleging breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and conversion, and sought damages and attorney’s fees.The defendants answered and asserted affirmative defenses. After repeated failures to comply with discovery orders and to retain new counsel following their attorney’s withdrawal, the Superior Court issued conditional orders of default, giving the defendants multiple opportunities to comply. When they did not, the court entered a default judgment for the contractor, including damages, costs, prejudgment interest, and attorney’s fees. The CEO appeared at some hearings but not others, raising concerns about notice and service, which were addressed by the trial justice, who instructed him to file a Rule 60 motion to vacate the default if he wished to contest notice. No such motion was filed. Both sides subsequently filed motions with the Rhode Island Supreme Court relating to remand and post-judgment relief.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed whether the trial justice abused discretion in entering the default judgment. It held that the defendants’ failure to file a Rule 60 motion or properly raise notice issues in the lower court precluded appellate review of those issues. The Court found no abuse of discretion in the entry of default and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The imposition of a cash bond as a condition for remand did not violate due process. View "Reagan Marine Construction, LLC v. Costa" on Justia Law

This case centers on a contractor’s claim for a Type I differing site condition relating to a flood control project in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana. The United States Army Corps of Engineers issued a solicitation for work on the Trapp Canal, which included boring logs and cross-sections of the canal but lacked specific information about the southwest bank. Hamp’s Construction LLC, after being awarded the contract, encountered unexpected bank failures in the southwest quadrant, resulting in unsafe conditions for land-based equipment and significant delays. Hamp’s Construction submitted a request for equitable adjustment and later a formal claim, asserting that the conditions encountered were materially different from those indicated in the contract documents.The contracting officer denied Hamp’s Construction’s request and subsequent claim, concluding there was insufficient proof of a differing site condition under the relevant Federal Acquisition Regulation clause. Hamp’s Construction appealed to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals. After a hearing, the Board found that although Hamp’s Construction had faced unforeseen difficulties and increased costs, the contract documents did not provide representations or indications about the subsurface conditions of the southwest bank. The Board emphasized the absence of boring logs or explicit information for the area where the failures occurred and denied the appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for substantial evidence. The court held that, for a Type I differing site condition claim, the contract must affirmatively indicate conditions at the disputed site. The court determined that Hamp’s Construction could not reasonably rely on contract documents as indications for the southwest bank. The court affirmed the Board’s decision, holding that Hamp’s Construction failed to establish a threshold element of a Type I differing site condition claim. View "HAMP'S CONSTRUCTION LLC v. SECRETARY OF THE ARMY" on Justia Law

A general contractor and a subcontractor entered into agreements for the construction and renovation of a facility. The subcontracts required disputes to be resolved by arbitration pursuant to the rules of the American Arbitration Association. The subcontractor performed work and submitted invoices, but the general contractor, while timely rejecting the invoices and providing reasons, failed to include the good faith certification required by the Massachusetts prompt pay act. The contractor later paid the invoices after an arbitrator determined that the invoices were deemed approved due to the lack of timely certification. Subsequently, the contractor filed a counterclaim in arbitration seeking recoupment of those payments, arguing the invoices were not fair and reasonable.The subcontractor initially brought suit in the Massachusetts Superior Court, which was then compelled to arbitration per the contract. During arbitration, the arbitrator found that the contractor’s failure to timely certify its rejection of the invoices resulted in the invoices being deemed approved and ordered payment to the subcontractor. After payment, the arbitrator allowed the contractor’s counterclaim for recoupment. Following evidentiary proceedings, the arbitrator ruled in favor of the contractor, awarding partial recoupment. The subcontractor moved in the Superior Court to vacate this award, arguing that the arbitrator exceeded his authority. Relying on J.C. Cannistraro, LLC v. Columbia Construction Co., the Superior Court judge vacated the recoupment portion of the arbitration award, finding that the contractor had asserted defenses before paying the invoices, contrary to precedent.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the matter on direct appellate review. It held that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority because the award was not prohibited by law nor did it violate public policy. The court determined that the prompt pay act did not expressly prohibit recoupment in these circumstances and that the arbitrator’s actions were within the broad scope granted by the parties’ agreement and the arbitration rules. The judgment vacating the arbitration award was reversed and the matter remanded for confirmation of the arbitration award. View "J.C. Cannistraro, LLC v. Columbia Construction Co." on Justia Law

Jose Medellin, an experienced independent contractor, was hired to assist with a roofing project at an apartment complex in San Antonio. While working on the roof, Medellin, along with other workers, was responsible for stretching a rubber membrane across the roof’s surface. During this task, Medellin lost track of the roof’s edge, fell approximately thirty feet, and suffered serious injuries. He subsequently sued the general contractor, alleging both negligent activity and premises liability, arguing that the lack of adequate safety measures contributed to his fall.The case proceeded to a jury trial in a Texas district court, where the jury found JMI Contractors, LLC liable under both negligent activity and premises liability theories, awarding Medellin over $3.3 million in compensatory damages and an additional $1 million in exemplary damages. JMI appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas, which initially ordered a new trial on unrelated grounds. Upon rehearing, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the necessary-use exception applied to Medellin’s premises liability claim, and that JMI owed him a duty of care due to its control over jobsite safety.The Supreme Court of Texas granted JMI’s petition for review. The Supreme Court held that Medellin’s claim properly sounded in premises liability, not negligent activity, as his injury arose from a dangerous condition (an unguarded roof edge) rather than contemporaneous conduct by JMI. Crucially, the Court held that independent contractors cannot recover under premises liability for injuries caused by open and obvious dangers and that the necessary-use exception does not apply to them. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and rendered a take-nothing judgment in favor of JMI. View "JMI CONTRACTORS, LLC v. MEDELLIN" on Justia Law

A trade association representing licensed contractors sued a municipal government, alleging that the city violated North Dakota’s statutory competitive bidding requirements for certain public improvement projects. The association claimed that the city self-performed various tasks during a road improvement project, despite the project’s estimated cost exceeding the statutory threshold for mandatory public bidding. After the project was substantially completed, the city adopted a new ordinance authorizing it to self-perform routine street maintenance, including milling and overlaying, regardless of cost.The case was heard in the District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District. The district court granted leave for the association to supplement its complaint with factual allegations about the completed project, but denied leave to challenge the newly adopted ordinance, concluding the association lacked standing because it had not shown an actual or threatened injury from action under the ordinance. After a hearing, the district court dismissed the case as moot, reasoning that because the road project had been completed, there was no ongoing controversy or relief to be granted.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the appeal. It held that the public interest exception to mootness applied, since litigation regarding competitive bidding statutes has statewide significance and guides the conduct of public officials across North Dakota. The Supreme Court further determined that the association had standing to challenge the city’s ordinance, because it alleged facts showing the ordinance threatened injury to its members—licensed contractors eligible to bid on public projects. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings, instructing reconsideration of whether the association may amend its complaint to challenge the ordinance. View "Associated General Contractors of North Dakota v. City of West Fargo" on Justia Law

After her property experienced water intrusion, a homeowner sued her neighbor, whose property was the source of the problem. The neighbor, in defending the lawsuit, hired a construction consulting firm to inspect both properties and to create an expert report recommending repairs. The recommendations from this report formed the basis of a settlement between the homeowner and her neighbor, and repairs were performed accordingly. After the settlement and repairs, the water intrusion problem recurred, leading the homeowner to file a new lawsuit against the consulting firm, alleging that its recommendations were negligent and defective.In the Superior Court of Orange County, the consulting firm filed an anti-SLAPP motion, asserting that its actions were protected as statements made in the course of litigation. The trial court granted the motion concerning certain claims, but denied it for claims of negligence and breach of contract as a third-party beneficiary, reasoning these arose from conduct rather than protected statements. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal previously affirmed the trial court’s partial denial, finding that the remaining claims were not based on protected activity, and remanded for further proceedings on those claims.Upon remand, the consulting firm moved for judgment on the pleadings, contending that the litigation privilege under California Civil Code section 47(b) barred the remaining claims. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the consulting firm. The court held that the litigation privilege applied because the firm’s formulation of repair recommendations was necessarily related to a communicative act (the expert report) prepared in the course of litigation, and thus barred the homeowner’s negligence and third-party beneficiary claims. The judgment in favor of the consulting firm was affirmed. View "Fazel v. Pete Fowler Construction Services" on Justia Law

A Mississippi construction company, operating under the name MCA Construction, Inc., entered into a contract with an Alabama property owner to perform site development work on a residential subdivision in Baldwin County. The contract was executed on February 11, 2021, and at that time, the company held an Alabama general contractor’s license with a “Building Construction” (BC) classification and an unlimited bid limit. Shortly before executing the contract, the city engineer raised questions regarding whether the BC classification was adequate for the planned utility work (such as water and sewer installation) and indicated that an additional “Municipal and Utility” (MU) classification might be required before such work began. MCA sought clarification from the state licensing board and subsequently obtained the MU classification in May 2021, before starting the utility work.The property owner, RAM-Robertsdale Subdivision Partners, LLC, along with related parties, later alleged that MCA had performed defective work and failed to pay subcontractors, and they brought suit in Baldwin Circuit Court. MCA filed counterclaims for breach of contract and fraud, asserting that it had not been fully paid for its work. The RAM parties moved for summary judgment, arguing that the contract was void because MCA was not properly licensed with the MU classification at the time the contract was executed.The Baldwin Circuit Court granted summary judgment for the RAM parties, holding that the contract was void because MCA was not “duly licensed” for all aspects of the work at the time of contracting. MCA appealed. The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the statutory and regulatory framework, noting that MCA had a valid BC license, acted in good faith, and obtained the MU classification before performing utility work. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that substantial compliance with the licensing statute was sufficient in these circumstances and that voiding the contract was not warranted. The court reversed the summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Construction Services, LLC v. RAM-Robertsdale Subdivision Partners, LLC" on Justia Law